When a Minister of Justice publicly declares that a court has “overstepped its competences,” the issue goes far beyond political disagreement. It becomes a serious constitutional and institutional risk, striking at the core principles of judicial independence and the separation of powers.
In a functioning rule-of-law system, the Minister of Justice is expected to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, not to publicly question or delegitimize judicial decisions—especially when those decisions concern senior government officials accused of serious abuses. Any such commentary from the executive branch inevitably carries political weight and creates pressure, whether explicit or implicit, on judges and prosecutors.
The problem is amplified when the case directly involves a colleague within the same government. In this context, the minister does not speak as a neutral legal authority, but as part of a political majority with a clear interest in the outcome of the proceedings. This transforms what might be framed as a “legal opinion” into political interference in an ongoing judicial process.
The constitutional principle of separation of powers exists precisely to prevent this scenario. Courts are not subordinate to the executive, nor are they required to tailor their decisions to political convenience. When a Minister of Justice publicly asserts that a court has exceeded its authority—before a final ruling by the Constitutional Court—he is effectively prejudging the judiciary and sending a discouraging signal to magistrates tasked with handling sensitive cases.
Such behavior sets a dangerous precedent. Today, the comments target a decision affecting a powerful deputy prime minister. Tomorrow, the same logic can be used to justify pressure against any judge who issues rulings unfavorable to those in power. In this way, political control over justice is reintroduced not through legislation, but through public statements, institutional authority, and intimidation by rhetoric.
Arguments about ministerial immunity do not neutralize this danger. Whether a court has jurisdiction or has exceeded its mandate is a matter for higher courts to determine—not for the Minister of Justice to decide publicly. Otherwise, judicial review is replaced by executive opinion, and the judiciary risks becoming an extension of political power.
In countries that genuinely respect judicial reform, restraint by the executive is a sign of democratic maturity. Public attacks, delegitimization, or commentary on court rulings—especially in cases involving alleged high-level corruption—signal fear, not confidence, in the justice system.
Ultimately, the risk lies not only in one statement, but in the normalization of the idea that a Minister of Justice can judge the judges. When the executive assumes the role of arbiter over the judiciary, the rule of law ceases to function.