A series of arrests and court proceedings in Kosovo, under suspicions of espionage in favor of Serbia’s Security Information Agency, BIA, has brought to light not only the criminal cases of the individuals involved, but also a broader security problem. Indictments and expert assessments suggest that the suspected interest is not limited to documents or reports, but extends to people with access to institutions, political vulnerabilities and opportunities for influence.
Open cases and the limits of what has been proven
In a little over two years, several people have been arrested in Kosovo on suspicion of spying for the BIA. Some cases are still on trial, while others have led to convictions.
However, these proceedings themselves do not automatically prove the existence of a single operation or a coordinated Serbian intelligence network in Kosovo. Some of the Special Prosecution’s claims still remain to be tested in court through final rulings.
One of the latest cases began to be heard on September 7 at the Basic Court in Prishtina. Fatmir Sheholli is accused of espionage and blackmail. According to the indictment, he is suspected of having been recruited by the BIA to gather information on political developments, the security situation and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions.
What information is claimed to have been sought
According to indictments filed in Kosovo, the suspected interest has covered a wide range of topics: the Kosovo Police, the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, political developments, elections, former KLA members, witnesses of the Special Court, as well as individuals or groups considered influential.
Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi are accused of collecting and transmitting information related to the KLA, the Kosovo Police and the AKI. According to the indictment, Shabani had also collected materials on the Recak massacre, while Qerimi gathered information on witnesses of the Special Court. Both have pleaded not guilty.
In another case, Fehim Sali is suspected of having collected and transmitted information and documents during 2024 and 2025 about certain people in Kosovo, including people whom the Prosecution describes as members of Wahhabi circles. Among those already convicted of espionage are also named Aleksandar Vllajiq and Jellena Gjukanoviq.
From data collection to political influence
Intelligence experts say information gathering is only the first phase. According to them, it matters just as much who secures that information, what access the source has and how the network built can later be used.
Professor Daniel Lomas says a foreign service first seeks to understand a country’s politics, economy, hierarchies and divisions, building contacts across different layers of society. Later, these networks can take on a political influence function.
Dushan Janjiq also argues that a service’s interest does not stop at concrete documents. According to him, people with access to them also have value, as do individuals who can exert influence through institutions. In this sense, a source inside the police or a state structure can be useful not only for the information provided, but also for identifying other targets.
The “Top Secret 2” document and the risk of polarization
According to the Prosecution, a photograph of a document called “Top Secret 2” was found on Fatmir Sheholli’s phone, claiming the existence of a plan to use the Islamic religion to divide Albanians and change the West’s perception of Kosovo.
The authorship and authenticity of this document have not been publicly clarified. The Islamic Community of Kosovo has denied the claims it contains and called for an investigation into its origin and authenticity.
Despite the uncertainties, publication of the document’s contents triggered strong reactions and clashes on social media. This highlighted how quickly unverified material can fuel divisions and accusations on already sensitive ground.
Institutions with few answers, questions remain open
The BIA has not given a position on the claims about its activity in Kosovo. Likewise, questions sent to Kosovo’s Special Prosecution and the AKI about the number of cases under investigation, possible links between them and the suspected scope of the activity have also remained unanswered.
Experts warn that espionage, in itself, is not enough to destabilize a state, but it can exploit existing political and social fractures. In that logic, the information collected can be used for classification, pressure, blackmail, discrediting or amplifying tensions that already exist.
What is known so far is partial. There is no public data on the possible scale of recruitment, the duration of the suspected ties or the amount of information that may have been passed to Serbian intelligence. For this reason, the picture remains fragmented and many of the main claims are still awaiting judicial proof.
This is precisely what makes the issue more serious than simply a series of criminal case files: when institutions provide little clarification and proceedings drag on, the vacuum is filled with suspicion, narratives and public tension.
In such an environment, the risk lies not only in the information gathered, but also in how it could be used to undermine trust in institutions and deepen existing divisions.