The Democratic Party has presented a detailed package for what it calls a real separation of the state from the party in the electoral process, aiming to set stronger limits on the use of public power for electoral interests. The document comes against a backdrop in which the debate over equality in the race is longstanding and where international reports have repeatedly raised concerns about the government’s institutional advantage.
What the proposed package aims to achieve
At its core, the proposal is based on the idea that parties should compete with their own resources, while the state should exercise its functions without turning into a campaign instrument. According to the document, free elections do not depend only on voting day, but also on the neutrality of the administration, the protection of voters from political pressure and the prevention of public resources being shifted in favor of an electoral subject.
The package argues that the current framework contains partial bans, but not a complete prevention system. According to this position, the use of funds, personnel, data, contracts, official activities or institutional communication can produce an electoral advantage even when it does not appear directly.
The document also refers to previous findings by international observation missions on the lack of equal conditions in the race and reports on the use of public resources during elections. However, the text itself distinguishes between the structural problem and concrete responsibility in each case, which, it says, must be proven individually.
Where the limits are set between governing and campaigning
One of the package’s central points is a horizontal ban: no institution, official or public employee should use state function, authority, resources or information to support or harm an electoral subject. This category includes not only public funds and property, but also administrative time, registers, personal data, communication infrastructure and the prestige of office itself.
According to the proposal, the line is not crossed simply because an action is political in nature, but when public competence is diverted to create electoral benefit, pressure, discrimination or political retaliation. This logic applies both to central and local government, as well as to enterprises under public control.
The package divides interventions into several areas: the administration, normative acts, the budget and procurement, public services, controls and inspections, data use, official activities and public communication. The idea is that the same mechanism of electoral influence can operate at the same time through payments, structures of subordination, institutional promotion and the use of the state apparatus.
A more active CEC, immediate measures and sanctions
On the institutional level, the proposal calls for a more active role for the CEC, not only as a body that receives complaints, but as a body that itself monitors activities, payments, contracts and institutional content carrying electoral risk. The document also mentions a special role for the Deputy Commissioner in monitoring and investigation, while decision-making on responsibility and sanctions would fall to the Complaints and Sanctions Commission in adversarial proceedings.
The package provides for three levels of response: the immediate cessation of the unlawful action, the restoration of the situation where possible and then administrative, disciplinary or criminal sanctions, depending on the case. Its logic is that a delayed fine after the election does not undo the advantage created before the vote.
The document stresses that responsibility should follow the real chain of decision-making, from the initiator and the person giving the order, to the implementer and the political subject that knowingly benefits. It also proposes that, for serious and proven violations, consequences should also be envisaged for candidacy, the mandate or the validity of the result, but not automatically.
What is envisaged for the media and the pre-election period
A separate part of the package touches on the relationship between the campaign, institutions and the media. According to the proposal, during the 75 days before voting there should be a ban on the full and live broadcast of promotional activities by the government and public bodies when these are institutional in nature and propagandistic.
The document distinguishes between the institutional signal and editorial reporting. According to this wording, the ban would target the immediate advantage produced by the live transmission of official activity, without extending to independent journalistic coverage or lawful party activities.
The package also proposes that the bans should not be limited only to the formal date of the act, but should follow the entire cycle of the decision: planning, commitment, contracting, payment, implementation and publicity. It is precisely here that the opposition’s main political claim is raised: that the electoral use of the state often does not happen through a single order, but through a chain of decisions and coordinated public exposure.
In conclusion, the PD document calls for profound changes to the Electoral Code and oversight mechanisms, arguing that the problem cannot be solved with scattered bans and symbolic fines.
On the political level, the package comes as an attempt to shift the debate from voting day to the way power is used throughout the entire pre-election period. It remains to be seen whether these proposals will find support beyond the latest rhetoric of electoral reform.