Peter Magyar is turning the fight against corruption into the biggest political test of his government. At the center is a strong promise: returning to the state assets that, under the new government line, were unfairly distributed during Viktor Orbán’s years in power.
A promise that strikes at the heart of the old system
The Tisza Party government has presented asset recovery as a matter of political credibility. In its version, this concerns money and assets obtained by oligarchs, party allies, intermediaries and people close to Orbán’s family during a long period of control over the state.
The wording may be uneven, but the essence remains clear: the promise is not limited to moral rhetoric. The government is also aiming at legal action against beneficiaries it considers illegitimate.
In Hungarian public opinion, this is directly linked to accusations of luxury built on public funds: residences, private jets, yachts and repeated profits from tenders worth billions. These are precisely the images fueling demands for political and criminal punishment.
The figures are large, but so are expectations
According to estimates cited during the campaign, Peter Magyar spoke of about 60 billion euros in assets that may have been wrongfully appropriated. Even much higher figures are now circulating, up to three times that value, showing how unclear and political the real scale of the operation remains.
In the background is a grim social and financial picture: the impoverishment of part of society, the departure of young people, the deterioration of public infrastructure and pressure on schools and hospitals. The budget deficit, according to the figures mentioned, has reached 7.5 percent of GDP.
It is precisely this contrast between the luxury of the elites and the weakening of public services that has made this promise a decisive test for the new government. If the assets are not returned and those responsible are not affected, the political cost for Magyar could be high.
A super-institution with unusual powers
At the end of July, parliament established by law the National Authority for the Recovery and Protection of Assets, known as NVVH. Under the model presented so far, this authority will have very broad powers and a high degree of independence.
The new structure is expected to investigate retrospectively the flow of public money and the use of assets, including real estate. In practice, the main focus appears to be the Orbán system period, meaning cases dating from 2010 onward.
What makes the NVVH controversial is its institutional weight: under the approved framework, the authority can investigate and bring charges, while being accountable only to parliament. For a country with a weak history of punishment for high-level corruption, this is seen both as a strong instrument and as a mechanism with a pronounced political burden.
The appointment at the top sparks controversy
The 46-year-old political scientist Anna Unger has been appointed to lead the NVVH, a choice that has surprised quite a few observers. She comes from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest and is knowledgeable about political systems, democratic institutions and party financing, but she is not regarded as a proven figure on the anti-corruption front, nor is she a lawyer.
Criticism increased after her statement that it would be unrealistic to expect final court rulings in major corruption cases during the first six-year mandate. Critics read this as a signal that the major promise may collide with the slow pace of justice.
Peter Magyar reacted sharply to these objections, rejecting the idea that the head of the authority should be chosen according to the logic of a spectacular public competition. On the other hand, government representatives have argued that Unger was valued for her broader vision of how the mechanism of misappropriating public assets should be dismantled.
Between demanded justice and the risk of politicization
The debate in Hungary is not only about whether money will be returned to the state, but also about how this will be done. Public expectations, according to local analysts, are for a full confrontation with the old system and not for a symbolic operation.
This places the Magyar government on a fine line: if it acts slowly, it risks being accused of failure; if it pushes hard for punishment, it will face serious questions about legal standards, the independence of procedures and the political use of new institutions.
For now, the government has set up the instrument it claims will reach corruption from the Orbán era. The real test begins now: not with campaign slogans, but with evidence, investigations and the ability not to turn justice into the next political weapon.
The operation launched by the Hungarian government is seen as one of the strongest confrontations with the legacy of Viktor Orbán’s rule.
But how much of the promise of asset recovery will translate into concrete results remains open amid public enthusiasm, institutional doubts and a heated political climate.